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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, • • 
Plaintiff-Respondent, • • 
-v- • Case No • 18134 • 
BRENT BINDRUP, • • 
Defendant-Appellant. • • 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Brent Bindrup, appeals from a 
conviction of second-degree murder in the Second Judicial 
District in and for the County of Weber, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty of second-degree 
murder in a non-jury trial held before the Honorable Calvin 
Gould on September 21, 1981. Appellant was sentenced to a 
term of five years to life, which sentence was suspended and 
the appellant was placed on probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks af firmance of the conviction 
and judgment pronounced below. In the alternative, respondent 
seeks an order of this Court remanding the case to the Second 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Judicial District Court with directions to that court to enter 
a judgment of conviction of manslaughter. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early morning hours of October 8, 1980, Ogden 
City Police Officer Mike King, on regular patrol duty, "heard 
a loud bang, a popping sound," and looked up in time to see a 
pick-up truck sliding sideways followed by a motorcycle, 
various parts of debris, and a body "flying through the air" 
down Washington Boulevard (T. 9)o He pulled his patrol car 
into the intersection of Washington ari(f'"'3lst South and 5-10 
seconds after the accident noticed.the light was still red in 
the direction appellant was traveling -(T. 9)o Officer King 
immediately radioed for assistance and checked the body he had 
seen tumbling down the street (To 10). The victim, Mr. Charles 
Feeney, was dead (T. 11). Officer King then assisted Mr. 
Brent Bindrup, the appellant and driver of the pick-up truck, 
and a passenger in the truck, Mr. Kerry Moyes, out of the 
overturned trucko The appellant and Mr. Moyes sustained minor 
injuries (T. 11) o 
The appellant was charged with second-degree murder 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated, § 76-5-203 (1953), as 
amended. He was tried without a jury before the Honorable 
Calvin Gould, Judge of the Second Judicial District in and for 
Weber County, State of Utah, on September 3, 1981. 
At the trial Officer King testified that he saw the 
motorcycle operated by Mr. Feeney traveling east on 31st South 
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seconds before a building obstructed his view and he heard the 
accident. Mr. Feeney was traveling within the speed limit, 
with his lights on, and appeared to be observing all traffic 
laws (T. 19). Subsequent autopsy indicated that Mr. Feeney 
had no drugs or alcohol in his system at the time of the 
accident, and that he died from multiple contusions, 
lacerations and fractures over most of his body (R. 29-33). 
Vicky Bojanski was traveling south on Washington 
Boulevard moments before the accident. She stopped at the red 
light on 30th South and saw the appellant's truck approaching 
"quite fast" in her rear view mirror (T. 94). She was afraid 
the truck would hit her as it sped into the 30th South 
intersection before the traffic semaphore turned green. She 
watched the truck as it swerved back into the lane in which 
she was driving. When the light turned green Vicky continued 
down Washington Boulevard, keeping her eyes on the truck (T. 
95). The truck did not slow down as it approached the red 
light on the 31st South intersection, and Vicky thought to 
herself "he is going to run that light to9." She then noticed 
a "glance" of light and heard a crash before she pulled up 
behind the scene of the accident (T. 96). 
Kerry Moyes, the passenger riding with the 
appellant, testified that despite at least four (T. 57, 73) 
attempts to get the appellant to slow down and orive better, 
-3-
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the appellant "just kept going." He "just hit the pedal and 
cruised" (Re 21) through seven red lights (T. 60)e The 
appellant responded to the pleas to slow down by hitting the 
pedal and cruising {R. 26, 28; T. 57). 
Accident investigation showed that the appellant hit 
Mr. Feeney with the right front of the pick-up truck, damaging 
the light, grill, and fender of the truck (T. 14)o The 
motorcycle and Mr. Feeney were struck on their left sides (Ro 
29-33). Mr. Feeney's body was found 151 feet down Washington 
Boulevard (T. 12). The motorcycle flew· ·t:nrough the air 62 
feet __ (T. 13) before gouging the road surface and tumbling to a 
rest 179 feet from the point of impact. The appellant's truck 
slid sideways, rolled, and toppled to a rest upside down 246 
feet from the point of collision (T. 12). The appellant's 
blood alcohol level was found to be .12% approximately one 
hour after the wreck (T. 39). 
Officer Kevin Youngberg testified that the appellant 
was going 59 miles per hour after he hit the motorcycle and 
went into a skid (T. 104). Officer Youngberg based this 
testimony on the curve of the tire scuffs left on the surface 
of Washington Boulevard before the truck began to roll. 
The appellant testified in his own behalf. His 
version of the incident is characterized by an attempt to 
mitigate the severity of what occurred. However, appellant 
-4-
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did admit that immediately after the collision occurred he 
realized the semaphore for the direction he had been traveling 
was red (T. 200, 204-205). He also acknowledged that he 
realized if someone came through the intersection from the 
opposite direction he would have seriously injured or killed 
them ( T. 210) • 
Appellant testified that his right leg was 
artificial, that he drove with his left leg, and attempted to 
account for the apparent speed of the truck as determined 
after it rolled by stating that his artificial leg fell on the 
accelerator after the initial collision ~ith Mr. Feeney (T. 
182, 190, 201). He stated that he never drove more than 40 
miles per hour (T. 197). He further testified that he had a 
problem with hearing "voices" which told him to do irrational 
things and that he had been hearing such "voices" while 




THE APPELLANT ACTED WITH THE "DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE TO HUM.AN LIFE" NECESSARY TO 
SUSTAIN THE SECOND-DEGREE MURDER 
CONVICTION. 
The appellant was charged with violating Utah Code 
Annotated, § 76-5-203 (1953), as amended: 
-5-
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76-5-203. Murder in the second degree. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder 
in the second degree if the actor: 
* * * (c) Acting under circumstances evidencing 
a depraved indifference to human life, he 
engaged in conduct which creates a grave 
risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another; 
(2) Murder in the second degree is a 
felony of the first degree. 
The appellant was intentionally speeding and running 
red lights as he killed Mr. Feeney. These substantive facts 
show that the appellant created a "grave.risk of death" for 
Mr. Feeney and are not in dispute on appeal. The question is 
whether the evidence supports the finding that the appellant's 
actions evidenced a "depraved indifference to human life" as 
he sped through the red lights on Washington Boulevard. 
Utah statutes do not define "depraved indifference 
to human life;" however, this Court has provided sufficient 
precedent to pinpoint the meaning of the phrase. In State v. 
Day, Utah, 572 P.2d 703, 705 {1977) we note the following: 
Ordinarily, non-technical words of 
ordinary meaning should not be ·elaborated 
upon in the instructions given by the 
court. It is presumed that jurors have 
ordinary intelligence and understand the 
meaning of ordinary words like "depraved" 
and "indifference." 
[3] While the jury was deliberating, they 
requested a dictionary •••• 
-6-
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* * * 
It is difficult to believe that the court, 
by an instruction, could have improved 
upon the definitions contained in the 
dictionary. 
This Court felt that the factfinder was qualified to know the 
ordinary meaning of "depraved indifference to human life" and 
was willing to rely on the factfinder's determination of the 
sufficiency of the evidence showing "depraved indifference." 
Later, in State v. Nicholson, Utah, 585 P.2d 60, 62, 
63 (1978), this Court added: 
Defense counsel indulges in a lengthy 
dissertation about the historical changes 
in statutes, concerning what is ~malice," 
comparing manslaughter and murd~r 
legislation that leads to some kind of 
conclusion that 76-5-203 doesn't mean 
"depraved indifference" but something 
different and greater than "negligent" or 
"reckless," which requires a higher degree 
of proof. He seems to be suggesting that 
in this case defendant was simply 
negligent, or careless, or reckless; and 
that consequently there was insufficient 
evidence to reflect "depraved · 
indifference." 
* * * 
Defendant's discussion as to the meaning 
of the language of the statute is academic 
and tends to obfuscate the normal 
interpretation of familiar word~,~and 
there appears to be nothing ambiguous or 
uncertain in the language, particularly 
that in "c". 
Day and Nicholson clearly indicate that the meaning 
of "depraved indifference" is not to be confused by legal 
applications of extrinsic theories; the words connote their 
-7-
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usual and ordinary meanings and that is all. Nicholson cites 
five cases from other jurisdictions wherein "depravity" was at 
issue to provide -guidelines as to the words' ordinary 
meaningse One such case, Wagner v. State, 250 NoW.2d 331, 340 
(Wis. 1977), contains an excellent discussion of "depravity": 
• o • The depravity of mind referred to in 
second degree murder exists when the 
conduct causing death demonstrates an 
~tter lack of concern for the life and 
safety of another and for which conduct 
there is no justification or excuse • o o 
* * * ,-·.- ··J. A depraved mind is one having in [sic] 
inherent deficiency of moral sense and 
rectitude. Otherwise it-would not prompt 
an act which in its nature is imminently 
dangerous to the safety of another. The 
element of the disregard for life likewise 
calls for a state of mind which has no 
regard for the moral or social duties of a 
human being. 
A depraved mind must be indifferent to the 
life of others. Such negative attitude is 
not found in the mind of a nor~al, 
reasonable person. The desire to live and 
the recognition others desire to live and 
have a right to life is innate in the mind 
of a normal person. Mere negligence alone 
is not sufficient. A high degree of 
negligence may be an element.- ·_. Such degree 
of negligence is an element of ·homicide by 
negligent use of a vehicle or weapon. 
See also: State v. Draves, Or. App., 524 P.2d 1225 (1974); 
State v. Hokenson, 527 P.2d 487 (Ida. 1974). 
For centuries the common law required a showing of 
malice for second-degree murder. As time went by, the legal 
-8-
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meaning of malice developed to connote an "evil intent" 
whereas the ordinary meaning remained "animosity" or "ill 
will." The distinction became difficult for jurors to 
understand and confusion in instructions and verdicts 
resulted. This divergence in definition prompted the drafters 
of the Model Penal Code to eliminate malice from the 
legislative descriptions of homicides in the 19SO's. The Utah 
Legislature intentionally avoided the concept of malice in the 
present Utah Criminal Code for the same reason. Justice 
Wilkins, concurring in the Nicholson opinion at 63, stated: 
The main opinion cites cases and-discusses 
principles of law which were pertinent to 
our criminal code prior to 1973, at which 
time the Utah Legislature enacted the 
present statutes under which defendant was 
convicted. The term "malice" and "malice 
aforethought" are not used in the present 
homicide statutes. The term "malice" was 
part of the prior law. Likewise, the 
prior statutes provided that "malice" was 
"express" or "implied" while t~e new 
statutes use entirely different language. 
We must apply the new law, not engraft the 
old terms into the new statute when the 
Legislature has seen fit to change those 
terms. 
Justice Wilkins presented an excellent discussion of the 
various standards in the Model Penal Code as it relates to 
"depraved indifference" and concluded: 
I do not believe that the Legislature 
intended that "depraved indifference to 
human life" under subsection ( c) should be 
-9-
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Id. at 65. 
measured by the same "awareness" of the 
certainty that the risk would result in 
death as the word "knowing" would entail o 
Instead, the greatness of the risk, and 
the lack of justification for the creation 
of that risk are the tests. 
Although in an earlier case, this Court stated: 
For many years the definition of second 
degree murder has been the unlawful 
killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought, and that of manslaughter was 
the unlawful killing of a human being 
without malice. In out opinion the new 
criminal code has not changed those 
,,,.~ ·. - . "" . definitions. 
Farrow v. Smith, Utah, 541 P.2d 1107, 1109 _(1975)0 As Day and 
Nicholson provide, it is now clear that malice is no longer a 
necessary element of second-degree murder in Utah. Even if it 
were an element, the cases discussed below indicate that this 
case was properly a second-degree murder case. 
Because the Utah Criminal Code is relatively new and 
the standard of "depraved indifference to human life" is 
novel, there is little precedent for second-degree murder 
convictions under similar statutes in other jurisdictions and 
involving facts similar to this case. Murder of the second 
degree has, however, been found under similar facts with 
statutes requiring malice, express or implied. 
-10-
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In Commonwealth v. Taylor, 337 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1975), 
the intoxicated defendant, speeding in an automobile, hit a 
youngster on a bicycle and killed him. On appeal, the court 
found the evidence adequate to show: 
wanton and reckless conduct which 
manifests an extreme indifference to the 
value of human life which transcends the 
negligent killing and reaches the level of 
malice which supports a verdict of murder 
in the second degree. 
Id. at 548. The conviction of second-degree murder was 
affirmed. 
In Layne v. State, 531 S.W.2d 802 (Tenn. 1975), the 
court held that a claimed "overwhelming compulsion~ to ingest 
drugs and alcohol would not justify the reckless use of a 
motor vehicle. The inebriated defendant negligently crossed 
the center line of the highway and killed two people in a 
head-on collision. 
• • • we nevertheless hold that a driver 
of an automobile while intoxicated and 
driving recklessly upon the public 
highway, will not be heard to say he had 
no intention of doing an injury to the 
person or property of another •. The intent 
to commit a criminal act, •.•. is 
evidenced by the act itself, so in the 
case at bar intent is evidenced (1) by the 
wilful drinking of intoxicating liquors, 
(2) knowingly driving an automobile while 
drunk at a dangerous and reckless rate of 
speed, to wit 60 and 70 miles an hour, and 
{3) with knowledge that his condition in 
thus driving was perilous to every person 
-11-
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on the highway including the defendant 
himself. It would be a mockery of the law 
for one thus guilty of violating the 
criminal laws of the State, enacted for 
the protection of human life, to say he 
could not foresee the consequence of his 
act. 
Id. at 803, 804. The conviction of second-degree murder was 
af firmedo 
In Palmer v. State, 401 So. 2d 266 (Alaa 1981), the 
defendant was convicted of second-degree murder after killing 
the victim in an automobile accidento The court found the 
defendant capable of second-degree murae·t ,although his blood 
alcohol level was .26% two hours after the fatal accident. 
Proof of consciousness of the act, consciousness of impeding 
danger, and of consciousness of probable results, with 
reckless indifference to the probable consequences was 
apparento The conviction of second-degree murder was 
affirmed. 
In Commandu v. State, 374 So. 2d 910 (Ala. 1978), 
Mrs. Henderson had pulled off the road to fix a flat tire. 
Her son was removing the spare from the ·trunk when the drunk 
defendant, coming from behind, hit Mrs. Henderson's car and 
knocked it 80 feet down the road. The Henderson boy did not 
survive the accident. 
Mrs. Henderson was repelled away from her 
automobile by the collision. She 
sustained a broken leg and sent two of her 
-12-
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children to seek help. Mrs. Henderson 
testified that she saw the appellant get 
out of his automobile and throw some 
bottles out of his car. She called to him 
and after two or three minutes he came 
over and asked if she was all right. 
"I said, 'Yes, but you have killed my 
young'un'. He said 'No, I hadn't killed 
nobody'. So, I could smell the alcohol 
around him and I told him. I said, 
'You're drunk, ain't you'? He said, 'No 
lady, I'm not drunk, but I'm gonna be 
drunk'. And I told him next time he put a 
beer to his mouth, I hoped he could see 
what he had done there tonight." 
The appellant then went and lay down near 
the Henderson automobile. 
Id. at 912. 
The court held that it was a "settled principle of 
law that where death ensues from an act done without lawful 
purpose, dangerous to life, malice is implied." Id. at 914. 
The conviction of second-degree murder was affirmed. 
In Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 
1978), the defendant appealed from a twenty-year sentence 
based upon a conviction of second-degree murder. The 
defendant had been traveling down a stree~ at 50 miles per 
hour, ignored a red light and killed a woman lawfully entering 
the intersection on a green light. Two hours after the 
accident the defendant's blood alcohol level was .18%. The 
applicable statute for second-degree murder was similar to 
that of the statute considered in this case and read: 
-13-
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A person is guilty of murder when: (b) 
Under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to human life, he wantonly 
engaged in conduct which creates a grave 
risk of death to another person and 
thereby causes the death of another 
person. 
Id. at 541. The court found the defendant's conduct met the 
requirements of the statute: 
The facts in this case demonstrate that 
the accident was not the typical 
automobile accident where a driver makes a 
gross error of judgment and is tried for 
manslaughter or reckless homicide. 
Rather, Hamilton's conduct surpasses the 
usual vehicle manslaughter case,and 
demonstrates "wanton" conduct and extreme 
indifference to human life. The jury was 
instructed on murder, second degree 
manslaughter and reckless homicide. It 
found that Hamilton should· have known of 
the plain and obvious likelihood that 
death or great bodily injury could have 
resulted from operating his truck, while 
in a drunken condition, through an 
intersection where a red light demanded 
that he stop. 
This is a "hurry-up" world of people on 
the go, with heavy traffic by high-powered 
vehicles on all types of roads and at all 
times of the day or night. Such a 
situation coupled with a driver's inclina-
tion to take "one or more [drinks] for the 
road," increases the vehicular ·aeath rate 
on the highways of this Commonwealth. A 
majority of the members of this court is 
of the opinion that the legislature 
enacted KRS 507.020{l)(b) to deter such 
conduct. The legislature is commended for 
taking a giant step forward. Its action 
in enacting this statute will do much to 
decrease vehicular highway deaths by 
persons operating an automobile while 
under the influence of intoxicants. 
-14-
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Id. at 541. The conviction for second-degree murder was 
affirmed. 
The fact findings of the trial court will not be 
disturbed by this Court unless " • • • the evidence was so 
inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting 
fairly must have entertained reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime." State v. Mills, Utah, 530-
P.2d 1272 (1975); State v. Wilson, Utah, 565 P.2d 66 (1977); 
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980). Further, the 
evidence relied upon by the trier of fact need not refute 
contrary allegations by the defendant. State v. Lamm, supra, 
at 232. As discussed above, and as will be further discussed 
in Point III of this brief, the evidence adduced in this case 
was sufficient to support Judge Gould's finding that 
appellant's conduct constituted "depraved indifference to 
human life" in convicting appellant of second-degree murder 
(R. 18). This conviction should not be reversed for 
insufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of guilt. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT WAS AWARE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL 
AND UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK OF DEATH AND 
THEREFORE THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE 
STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY. 
At the time of the accident in this case, Utah Code 
Annotated, § 76-5-207 (1953), as amended, read: 
-15-
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76-5-207. Automobile homicide~ (1) 
Criminal homicide constitutes automobile 
homicide if the actor, while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, a 
controlled substance, or any drug, to a 
degree which renders the actor incapable 
of safely driving a vehicle, causes the 
death of another by operating a motor 
vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(2) The presumption established by Section 
41-6-44(b) of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, 
relating to blood alcohol percentages, 
shall be applicable to this section, and 
any chemical test administered on a 
defendant with his consent or after his 
arrest under this section, whether with or 
against his consent, shall be admissible 
in accordance with the rules.of evidence. 
(3) For purposes of the automobile 
homicide section, a motor vehicle 
constitutes any self-propelled vehicle and 
includes, but is not limited to, any 
automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, 
engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
(4) Automobile homicide is a felony of the 
third degree. 
The standard of negligence required for conviction 
under this statute was criminal negligence as defined in Utah 
Code Annotated, § 76-2-103 (1953), as am~nded. State v. 
Chavez, Utah, 605 P.2d 1226 (1979). Section 76-2-103 
provides: 
A person engages in conduct: 
{4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result Of his conduct when he ought to 
be aware of a substantial and -
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
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must be of such a nature and degree that 
the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care 
that .an ordinary person would exercise in 
all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
Criminal negligence requires only that the of fender 
ought to have been aware of the substantial and unjustifiable 
risk associated with the conduct. In this case it was shown 
at trial that the appellant was actually aware of the grave 
risk of death to another, as is evidenced by the testimony of 
the appellant himself. 
( T. 210) • 
Q. Brent, you realized that if somebody 
did come through a green light geing 
through one of those intersectioris, and 
you hit them, they might he seriously 
injured or killed, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew what you were doing, didn't 
you? 
A. Well, yeah, I guess I knew what I was 
doing. 
Q. Okay. were you concerned about the 
fact that somebody might run through those 
intersections on a green light, and you 
would be there to meet them? 
A. No, the thought never crossed· my mind. 
I was watching for them. 
Moreover, if the appellant was not aware of it on 
his own, his companion and passenger, Kerry Moyes, made it 
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clear to the appellant that he was creating a risk of death 
(T. 57, 73). The following is from a police report by Moyes: 
Q. Did Bindrup stop at any of the lights 
or did he just slow down and then proceed 
through. 
A. He stopped at some of them, I know he 
didn't run all of them from the Golden 
Spike. But he did run the last five or 
six. 
Q. What street did you enter Washington 
Blvd. from? 
A. I don't remember. It seems like we 
went straight from Harrisville Rd. to 
Washington Blvd. 
Q. How fast were you traveling down 
Washington Blvd.? 
A. I never looked at his gauge. 
Q. Did you feel he was traveT"ir,ig too fast 
or dangerously driving? 
A. I don't feel he was driving 
dangerously but he was at least ten overo 
Q. Did you ever ask Bindrup to slow the 
truck down? 
A. I didn't ask him I told him to slow it 
down. 
Q. Did you run any red lights at a high 
rate of speed before the accident? 
A. At least one. 
(R. 27, State's Exhibit K) (emphasis added); and the following 
from the preliminary hearing: 
Q. Yes. Okay. Now, did Brent slow down 
at all for the last several re~ lights 
that he ran including the one ·at 31st and 
Washington where he hit the mo~orcycle? 
A. No, sir. The last few he just went 
straight through. 
Q. What did you say to Brent when he 
started driving like this? 
A. I told him to stop. 
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Q. Were you concerned about the 
circumstances? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was Brent's reaction when you 
told him to slow down :or knock it off? 
A. He just kept going. 
Q. Did he say anything? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he look at you or change his 
facial expression at all? 
A. He looked at me and that, and kept 
going. 
Q. Just kept going? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many times did you tell him to 
knock it off or slow down? 
A. About four times. 
(R. 21, State's Exhibit L). 
The appellant did not kill Charles Feeney as a 
result of criminally negligent behavior; he intentionally sped 
through the red light at the intersection of 31st South and 
Washington Boulevard, causing the grave risk of death to 
himself, his passenger, and Mr. Feeney. His intoxicated 
condition did not prevent him from being aware of the 
circumstances whereby he killed a man. There was no delayed 
reaction, no torpid attempt to stop for the light, no clouded 
perception of the situation, and no mistake as to the speed 
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the appellant was traveling. The appellant began speeding, 
began running red lights in the wee hours of the morning1 he 
grew bolder at each light as the chance for collision became 
greater at each light. He intentionally and repeatedly drove 
through intersections he was prohibited from entering and by 
so doing disregarded the grave risk of death he created 
thereby. Kerry Moyes testified that the appellant "drove real 
good" (T. 20) until he started running red lights. The 
appellant decided to disregard the light at 31st South and 
killed Mr. Feeney. Thus, his conduct'~~idenced much more than 
mere-criminal negligence. Cf. State v. Hallett, Utah, 619 
P.2d 335 (1980), bending over a stop sign constitutes criminal 
negligence. Appellant's argument that since his conduct 
occurred at 2:00 a.m. rather than at some other time when 
there might have been more traffic, his conduct shows only 
negligence and not "depraved indifferenc~" is misplaced. 
There was no evidence that the streets were "virtually 
deserted" as alleged in appellant's brief, and even if there 
were, it would not change the nature of ··appellant's conduct. 
In addition, appellant's contention that prior cases involving 
convictions of automobile homicide involved more egregious 
fact situations than this case and thus that the evidence in 
this case does not support a conviction of murder, is also 
without merit. Appellant cites State v. Chavez, Utah, 605 
P.2d 1226 (1979) as a case in which the facts evidenced a 
higher degree of depravity than those of the case at bar. 
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Respondent submits that the facts of Chavez might 
have supported a second-degree murder conviction; that issue 
was simply not raised since the defendant there was not so 
charged. Thus, Chavez is not authority for the proposition 
that conduct such as appellant's cannot support a conviction 
under§ 76-5-203(c). 
Finally, appellant alleges that the automobile 
homicide statute is more specific than the second-degree 
murder statute and thus that the former should control. As 
argued above, respondent contends that'- ·appellant's conduct 
evidenced a state of mind at least higher than that of 
criminal negligence. Appellant was actually aware of the 
danger he was creating to human life and acted in complete 
disregard of that dangere Thus, the automobile homicide 
statute, which at the time of the conviction required proof of 
criminal negligence, does not apply to the facts of this case. 
Appellant's contention that it is the more specific of two 
statutes, either of which might apply in this case, is 
erroneous. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S CONDUCT EVIDENCED "DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE" AND NOT MERELY 
RECKLESSNESS AS REQUIRED FOR A CONVICTION 
OF MANSLAUGHTER. 
Respondent recognizes that the Utah Legislature 
eliminated the word "reckless" from § 76-5-203(c} in 1979. 
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The causing of a death in a reckless manner is now proscribed 
by§ 76-5-205(a), the manslaughter statute. The definition of 
"recklessly" is found in § 76-2-103(3) as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: $ o • 
(3) Rec-klessly, or maliciously, with 
respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he is aware of but consciously disregards 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. the risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that its disregard constitutes 
a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would 
exercise under all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Appellant contends in Point III of his brief that if this 
Court reverses his conviction of second~degree murder, he is 
entitled to the benefit of the automobile homicide statute, 
rather than the manslaughter statute, on the theory that where 
the same conduct is proscribed by two different statutes 
involving different penalties, the accused is entitled to the 
benefit of the lesser penalty. 
This argument does not apply in this case since 
§ 76-5-207 and § 76-5-203 do not proscribe the same conduct. 
A conviction of manslaughter requires proof of recklessness, 
while an automobile homicide conviction requires proof of only 
criminal negligence. Each of these terms is defined by 
statute, and although each involves a gross deviation from the 
ordinary standard of care, the distinction between the two is 
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that for criminal negligence the actor "ought" to be aware of 
the risk while for recklessness the actor is aware but 
consciously disregards the risk. Appellant's contention thus 
fails. 
Respondent contends that although appellant's 
conduct in this case could have supported a manslaughter 
conviction, it went even beyond the degree of recklessness 
required under § 76-5-205. Since the term "reckless" was 
removed from § 76-5-203(c} in 1979, it may be presumed that 
,. - . •J • 
the Legislature intended that "depraved indifference to human 
life" is a mental state greater than reckl~ssness as defined 
in § 76-2-103. In this case, appellant did not simply 
consciously disregard a known risk of death to another (i.e., 
recklessness), he continued running through stoplights at a 
high rate of speed despite repeated warnings by his passenger. 
Appellant acknowledged those warnings by_srniling at ~r. Moyes 
and continuing his conduct (T. 57, 73; R. 21). As indicated 
in the Commentary to the Model Penal Code, risk is a matter of 
degree: 
Recklessness • • • presupposes an 
awareness of the creation of substantial 
homicidal risk, a risk too great to be 
deemed_ justifiable by any valid purpose 
that the actor's conduct serves. Since 
risk, however, is a matter of degree and 
the motives for risk creation may be 
infinite in variation, some formula is 
needed to identify the case where 
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recklessness should be assimilated too•• 
(intentional conduct). The conception 
that the draft employs is that of extreme 
indifference to the value of human life. 
The significance of ••• (intentional 
conduct) is that, cases of provocation 
apart, it demonstrates precisely such 
ind if fe·rence. • • • 
Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft #9, 29-30 (May 8, 1959). 
This is not a case where the appellant's state of 
mind must be inferred from the circumstances surrounding his 
conduct alone. The direct evidence of Mr. Moyes and even the 
testimony of appellant establish that his conduct was 
intentional. When viewed in this light, appellant's conduct 
is not distinguishable from shooting a guh -into a c-rowd or 
running one's vehicle into a parade, which appellant admits 
are situations justifying a second-degree murder conviction. 
The mere fortuity that this death occurred at 2:00 a.m. rather 
than at a time when the streets were more congested with 
traffic does not provide a basis for distinguishing 
appellant's conduct from the examples given. Just before the 
accident occurred, appellant had passed the vehicle of Vicky 
Bojansky as he ran through the rea light at,30th South and 
\'lashing ton Boulevard ( T. 94-96). Thus, appellant knew that 
the streets were not totally deserted, as he admitted at trial 
(T. 196). 
People v. Marcy, Colo., 628 P.2d 69 (1981) provides 
significant guidance in distinguishing "extreme indifference 
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human life" from reckless manslaughter. In Marcy, the 
Colorado Supreme Court held that "extreme indifference to 
human life" was not sufficiently distinguishable from the 
second-degree murder statute to provide a rational basis for 
punishing such murders under the first-degree murder 
provisions. The Court went on to discuss the meaning of 
extreme indifference murder as follows: 
Extreme indifference murder involves 
conduct that creates a grave risk of death 
to another. "Grave" is commonly 
unders toad to mean serious or imminent, or 
likely to produce great harm .. or\ danger. 
See Webster's New International Dictionary 
at 1094 (2d ed. 1958). Second degree 
murder encompasses conduct that is 
practically certain to cause the death of 
another [citations omitted]. "Practical 
certainty" has been used interchangeably 
with the term "more than merely a probable 
result" [citation omitted]. • • • it was 
described as "such a high probability of 
death that death was practically certain" 
[citation omitted]. In the context of 
criminal homicide, conduct that is 
practically certain to cause the death of 
another is the semantic equivalent of 
conduct creating a grave risk of death to 
another. Any difference here is so 
imperceptible as to vitiate its meaningful 
application in an aojudicativ~-' proceeoing. 
• • • 
The statutory terminoloqy under scrutiny 
is descriptive of the facts or 
circumstances under which the death 
causing conduct occurred. It seems to 
reflect a judgment that there is a certain 
indifference that is qualitatively 
distinct from the conscious disregard 
required for reckless manslaughter • • • 
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We do not view the term "under 
circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life" 
as without meaning. What it connotes is a 
heightened awareness and disregard of a 
fatal risk. People ex rel. Russel v. 
District Court (521 P.2d 1254 (Colo. 
1974)) ,· noted that "an extreme 
indifference to human life is clearly a 
more culpable standard of conduct "than 
the reckless conduct involved in 
manslaughter • • • Reckless manslaughter 
requires a conscious disregard of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
deaths 
628 P.2d 69, 79 (emphasis added). 
Applying this standard to this case, appellant's 
conduct evidenced that "depraved indif fereRce to human life" 
required to sustain a conviction of second-degree murder under 
§ 76-5-203(c), and went beyond the conscious disregard of a 
substantial risk of death as required under reckless 
manslaughter, § 76-5-205(l)(a). 
Even if this Court finds that the evidence in this 
case does not justify the conviction of second-degree murder, 
the evidence, as discussed above, without doubt supports a 
conviction of manslaughter, under§ 76-5-?0S(l)(a). In the 
event of such a finding, respondent requests that this Court 
exercise its statutory power to remand the case ordering entry 
of a judgment of conviction of the included offense of 
manslaughter. § 76-1-402(5) and cf. State v. Noren, Utah, 621 
P.2d 1224 (1980). The trier of fact in this case necessarily 
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had to find every fact necessary for conviction of 
manslaughter in finding appellant guilty of the greater 
offense of second-degree murder. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Automobile Homicide Statute was 
specifically enacted to deter drunk driving in this state. 
Since the mental state of a drunk person is so often difficult 
or hard to establish, the statute at the time of the 
conviction in this case required only proof of criminal 
,-·.· •J. 
negligence. Intoxication, a death caused by an automobile 
accident, and currently simple· negligence will sustain a 
violation of Section 76-5-207. Because of the ease of 
conviction under the statute, the Legislature classified its 
violation a third-degree felony--the same as writing a bad 
check (Utah Code Annotated, § 76-6-505 (1953), as amended). 
However, where an inebriate's mental state can be 
shown, and that state of mind evidences a depraved 
indifference to human life, the defendant should be held 
guilty of second-degree murder, a first-degree felony, despite 
his drunkenness. Otherwise, a few drinks before the 
intentional cond~ct constituting the crime would mitigate the 
severity of the criminal act. This cannot be the intention of 
the Utah Legislature. 
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Appellant acted in.these circumstances with depraved 
indifference to the value of human life and not merely in 
conscious disregard of a known risk of death or in a situation 
where he should have known of such a risk. Thus, he was 
properly convicted of second-degree murder rather than 
reckless manslaughter or automobile homicide. 
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to 
affirm the conviction of second-degree murder and further 
requests, if this Court reverses the murder conviction, that 
the Court remand the case to the trial court directing that 
court to enter a judgment" of conviction of-manslaughter. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of May, 1982. 
ROBERT N. 
Assistant 
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Utah, 84401, this 6th day of May, 1982. 
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• . Case No. 18134 
Defendant-Appellant. . . 
COMES NOW the respondent, by and through Robert N. 
Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, and respectfully submits 
the following newly uncovered case pursuant to Rule 75{p){3), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I. People v. Watson, Cal., 637 P.2d 279 (1981) is 
offered in support of the following propositions: 
A. A fact situation similar to the case at 
bar does not preclude a finding of implied 
malice to support a second-degree murder 
conviction even if proof of malice is 
required by statute. ra. at 281, 285-286. 
B. The automobile homicide statute is not a 
more specific statute which takes 
precedence over the second-degree murder 
statute since the elements of each 
(particularly the mental states involved) 
are not identical. Id. at 282-284. 
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C. The determination of criminal negligence 
to support a charge of automobile homicide 
in Utah is an objective test, whereas the 
test for determining "depraved indifference 
to human life" to support a charge of 
second-degree murder focuses on the 
subjective awareness by the defendant of 
the risk created by his conduct. Id. at 
283-284. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of June, 1982. 
BY: 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and exact copies 
of the foregoing Additional Authorities, postage prepaid, to 
Reed M. Richards and Bernard L. Allen, Attorneys for 
Appellant, The Public Defender Association, 2568 Washington 
Boulevard, Ogden, Utah, 84401, this 16th day of June, 1982. 
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